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EXONERATION OF THE
SPECIFIC DEVISE AT THE EXPENSE OF
THE RESIDUE
FRANCES M. RYAN*
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF EXONERATION
The right of the devisee of a specific piece of real estate to have the
mortgage on the devised property paid at the expense of the residue of
the estate is a heritage of the common law, which, until the recent de-
cision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Estate of Budd,' had re-
ceived little attention in this jurisdiction.
The rule that such a mortgage must be paid was forcefully laid down
in early English cases. In King v. King,2 it was stated:
... the court was of opinion, that every mortgage implies a loan,
and every loan implies a debt; and that though there was no
covenant nor bond, yet the personal estate of the borrower of
course remains liable to pay off the mortgage....
Likewise, in Bartholomew v. May,3 it was held:
... wherever there is a mortgage made by a person who is owner
of the estate, that mortgage is looked upon as a general debt,
and the land only as a security, and therefore the personal estate
shall be applied in discharge of the £1300, although there may
be younger children of the mortgagor who may be no otherwise
provided for....
In Cope v. Cope,4 the Court declared:
If a Man mortgages Lands, and covenants to pay the Money, and
dies, the Personal Estate of the Mortgagor shall, in Favor of the
Heir, be applied to exonerate the Mortgage.
The reasoning behind ihe doctrine in English law is sometimes said
to be that the personal estate ha3 beei increased by the proceeds of the
mortgage loan at the expense of the realty and that the personal estate
should, therefore, reimburse the devisee of the realty.5 The "justice"
*Associate, Affeldt & Lichtsinn, Milwaukee; B.A., Briar Cliff College; L.L.B.,
Marquette, 1947; L.L.M., Michigan, 1948; Former Editor-in-Chief, Marquette
Law Review. This article was prepared with the research assistance of Darryl
Kent Nevers of the Marquette Law Review.
1 11 Wis. 2d 248, 105 N.W. 2d 358 (1960).
2 3 P. Wins. 358, 361, 24 Eng. Rep. 1100 (Ch. 1735).
3 1 Atk. 487, 26 Eng. Rep. 309 (Ch. 1737).
4 2 Salk. 449, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 269, 21 Eng. Rep. 1038 (Ch. 1707); See Johnson
v. Milksopp, 2 Vern. 112, 23 Eng. Rep. 681 (Ch. 1689) ; Meynell v. Howard,
Prec. ch. 61, 24 Eng. Rep. 30 (Ch. 1696); Hill v. Bishop of London, 1 Atk.
618, 26 Eng. Rep. 388 (Ch. 1738) ; Noel v. Henley, 7 Price 241, 146 Eng. Rep.
960 (Ex. 1819); Bickham v. Cruttwell, 3 Myl. & Cr., 763, 40 Eng. Rep. 1120(Ch. 1838) ; 2 WENDELL, BLACESTONE'S COMMENTARIES 511, note 42.
5 In re Fogarty's Estate, 165 Misc. 78, 300 N.Y.S. 231 (1937) ; In re Staiger's
Estate, 104 N.J. Eq. 149, 144 Atl. 619 (1929) ; Mahoney v. Stewart, 123 N.C.
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explanation is not applicable to all cases, however; notably that of the
purchase-money mortgage.
Another thesis concerning the development of the exoneration rule
is the "consistency" explanation This line of reasoning proceeds as
follows: (1) The mortgagee may either file a claim against the estate
and force it to pay the mortgage or may forego filing of a claim and
rely solely upon his security; thereby putting the burden of payment
upon the devisee. (2) The choice of a stranger should not affect the
distribution of the estate, and to accomplish consistent distribution re-
gardless of the mortgagee's choice of procedures, a definite rule had to
be established. (3) It is more likely that the average testator intends
that the devisee take real property free of the mortgage than that he
receive it subject to an existing encumbrance. (4) Therefore, the specific
devise should be exonerated at the expense of the personal estate.
This explanation of the development of the doctrine of exoneration
is even more artificial than the "justice" explanation, since the basic
question originally before the courts was whether the personal estate
was ultimately liable at all for the debt represented by the mortgage.7
The "consistency" explanation is also the least satisfactory to the modern
mind because it rests on a second assumption that the average testator
prefers that the real property be relieved of the mortgage rather than
that it pass subject to it. In a predominantly pastoral society in which
real estate was the asset of main importance and its ownership was a
mark of social distinction, this may have been true. Today, however,
financial status and stability are determined in terms of total net worth
in which real and personal assets play an equally important part, and
the assumption that the average testator prefers to exonerate the speci-
fically devised real estate at the expense of the personalty is not as
convincing.
It would seem that the real foundation of the rule in English Juris-
prudence is that stated in the early English cases: The "mortgage is
looked upon as a general debt" ;" A "Man . ..covenants to pay the
Money."9 In other words the doctrine actually stems from the broader
106, 31 S.E. 384 (1898) ; But see Sutherland v. Harrison, 86 Ill. 363 (1877)
in which the Court dismissed this theory with the statement, "There is no such
principle of general application."
G40 HARV. L. Rzv. 630, 631 (1927) ; However, election of the mortgagee to for-
close his mortgage was held to prevent application of the common-law rule
although its existence was recognized in Marshall v. Middleton, 100 Ore. 247,
191 Pac. 886 (1921).
7 This argument was advanced in Galton v. Hancock, 2 Atk. 424, at 430, 26
Eng. Rep. 656 (Ch. 1742), but was dismissed by Lord Hardwicke on page 435
with the statement, "The mortgagee may take his remedy, indeed, against the
executor, or against the heir at his election; but it must likewise be admitted,
this election of the mortgagee will not determine which fund ought properly
to be charged, nor vary the right as to those funds."
s Bartholomew v. May, supra note 3.
0 Cope v. Cope, supra note 4.
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rule of law that the debts of the deceased must be paid from his per-
sonal estate. 10 The forces of justice and consistency may have helped
to entrench the doctrine among the principles of the common law, but
they cannot be said to have accounted for its beginnings.
Like every other common-law rule, this one had from the first its
limitations and its exceptions. Originally there were three limitations
of prime importance. First, the rule applied unless the will showed a
contrary intent."' This resulted in making the doctrine of exoneration
applicable to the majority of cases in which the will was silent as to
intent. It relieved the specific devisee of the burden of proving positive
intent on the part of the testator to exonerate and placed upon those
opposing exoneration the rather difficult burden of proving, in the face
of the silence of the will, that the testator did not intend to exonerate
the property. Secondly, the rule applied only if the mortgage was a
personal obligation of the decedent.' 2 This requirement flowed logically
from the broader source, the rule that the estate of a deceased person
was liable only for his personal debts in any event. If the owner of the
property had no personal liability during his lifetime to repay the princi-
pal sum secured by the mortgage, his estate could have none after his
death. Thirdly, the mortgage on specifically devised real estate was
payable only out of certain funds; chiefly, the personal property con-
tained in the residuary estate to the extent that the same was sufficient
therefor.23 This limitation, too, derives from the origin of the exonera-
tion rule, i.e., that the debts of the deceased must be paid from his
personal estate. As the law developed, of course, each of these principal
limitations was interpreted and applied in a variety of situations, a
process which has left many subrules in its wake.
England abrogated the common-law rule in 1854 by Locke King's
Act, and since the passage of that law and its amendments, any devisee
1o Bromhall v. Wilbraham, Cas. t. Tal. 274, 25 Eng. Rep. 774 (Ch. 1734) ; Galton
v. Hancock, supra note 7; Lanoy v. Athol, 2 Atk. 444, 26 Eng. Rep. 668 (Ch.
1742) ; Cumberland v. Codrington, 3 Johns Ch., 8 Am. Dec. 492 (N.Y. 1817),
and cases cited supra note 4; 57 Am. JuR. Wills §1474 (1948); 26A C.J.S.
Descent & Distribution §125(b) (1956) ; 4 PAGE, WILLS §1486 (3rd ed. 1941).
21 "If it appears that it was the testator's intention that the devisee should take
it encumbered, there is an end of the question." Galton v. Hancock, supra
note 7, at 428; see THOMPSON, WILLS §127; Annot., 5 A.L.R. 488 (1920), 72
A.L.R. 709 (1931); 4 PAGE, WILLS §1486, supra note 10; 3 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §14.25 (Casner ed. 1952) ; 3 JARMAN, WILLS 471 (1881).
12 "... where there is an encumbrance on real estate, the duty by which encum-
brances are created being a personal demand on the owner himself, the heir
at law shall have the benefit of the personal estate to exonerate the realty
.. , but if the ancestor has done no act to charge himself personally, the heir
at law must take the estate cur onere." Parsons v. Freeman, 1 Ambl. 115, 27
Eng. Rep. 75 (Ch. 1751); Forrester v. Leigh, 1 Ambl. 171, 27 Eng. Rep. 114
(Ch. 1753); see 4 PAGE, WILLS §1486, supra note 10; Annot., 5 A.L.R. 488,
499 (1920). Whether assumption by the testator of a prior lien, placed on the
property by another, satisfies this requirement is a matter on which there is
much conflict of opinion, 57 AM. JuR. WILLS §1476, supra note 10.
"sAuthorities cited, supra note 10.
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of real estate in England has taken the same subject to the encumbrances
existing thereon at the time of the testator's death, unless a contrary
intention is clearly evident from the face of the will.' 4 However, the
statutory change in England came too late to affect the situation in the
United States. The common law which became a part of the body of
law in force in the various states of the Union was the common law
as represented by English court decisions, customs, and legislation
shortly prior to the American Revolution, 5 and once adopted, this body
of law remained the common law of each of the several states until
changed by the state itself.'4
Since land, during the early days of the American Republic, was
plentiful, cheap, and largely unimproved, real estate mortgages were
probably not extensively used as a means of financing. As a result, the
factual situations which would bring the common-law rule of exonera-
tion into play and thus cause its desirability to be debated did not fre-
quently arise. By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, East-
ern and Southern states were beginning to pass corrective legislation on
the subject. However, by that time most central and Western states
had already been organized and had adopted, at an earlier date, basic
legislation similar to that then in force in one or more of the older
sister states of the East. In this part of the country, also, low-priced
land probably kept the problem from arising frequently for some time,
but eventually, the economic situation changed, and the feasibility of
the common-law rule of exoneration then became a matter of practical
importance. As a result some of the states in these areas also began to
enact legislation on the subject. Most of the state statutes followed the
English pattern and provided that the specifically devised real property
should not be exonerated from the mortgage unless the will so provided.
As a result of this legislation, there are now three types of court
decisions involving the right of a devisee to have his mortgage paid by
the estate. First, there are the cases in which no statutory enactment is
applicable, and the testator, by a specific provision of his will, has at-
tempted to provide for the payment of the mortgage for the benefit of
the specific devisee.' 7 The second group of cases is that in which the
'1 Real Estate Charges Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 113; 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c.
69; 1877, 40 & 41 Vict., c. 340.
2- See 11 Am. JuR. Common Law §3 (1937); Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 156(1864); Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354 (1903); City of Chip-
pewa Falls v. Hopkins, 109 Wis. 611, 85 N.W. 553 (1901); Menne v. Fond du
Lac, 273 Wis. 341, 77 N.W. 2d 703 (1956); Page, Statutes in Derogation of
the Common Law, The Canon as an Analytical Tool, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 78 et.
seq.
16 Authorities cited, supra note 15.
17 A construction that a gift of a sum sufficient to discharge the mortgage is not
effected by particular language of the will does not necessarily foreclose the
devisee from obtaining exoneration of the property on common law principles,
since he is in many cases entitled to the latter, even in the absence of a show-
ing of intent.
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testator has made no reference at all in his will, either directly or indi-
rectly, to the mortgage on the specifically devised property, and there
is no statutory provision covering the situation. In the third category
are the cases arising under a particular state statute.18 Strictly speaking,
the term "exoneration" refers to a result achieved by force of law
rather than because of the express desire of the testator and, therefore,
applies only to the second classification of cases. Cases in the first cate-
gory are actually true will-construction cases, since the testator has
attempted, although perhaps not very effectively, to express his desires
on the subject, and, in view of ambiguities in the language chosen, the
court is called upon to construe its meaning. The situation may be quite
similar in the third category of cases, but the decision must be made
within the framework of the applicable statute.
INTENT OF THE TESTATOR
In any instance, however, the first and most important matter is a
determination of the category into which the case falls, the intent of the
testator, and the effect of his intent in that particular type of case. If
the testator has directed expressly that the mortgage be paid, he is, in
effect, making an additional specific bequest to the devisee of the mort-
gaged property, and the mortgage is payable out of the estate generally
in the same manner as are other specific bequests. 19 In this type of case
a positive intent on the part of the testator is inherent in the provision
for the payment of the mortgage.
In the second category of cases, the initial and ultimate burden of
proving that the testator did not intend to exonerate the property falls
upon those interested in protecting the residue. However, the devisee,
in order to defeat these efforts, will often bring out circumstances war-
ranting a positive finding by the court of an implied intent to exonerate
the property.20
is Cases decided on common law principles of exoneration in states having sta-
tutes relating to exoneration are numerous, however, since it is often held
that the statute is limited in scope and does not change the common law rule
with regard to a particular type of situation, kind of property, or species of
lien.
'9 Will of Man, 179 Wis. 66, 190 N.W. 830 (1922), discussed at length at a later
point herein, is a case of this type, and the Court held that the mortgage was
a charge upon the general estate. See 40 HARV. L. REV. 631, supra note 6.
20 This tendency has led some authorities to conclude that there is a minority
view of some weight that under the common law, exoneration is not permis-
sible unless a positive intent to exonerate can be implied from the will. See 4
PAGE, WILLS §1490, supra note 10. The increase in the number of cases de-
cided under statutes requiring a positive finding of intent to exonerate has
also lent apparent weight to this theory. In annotations on the subject to
exoneration at 5 A.L.R. 488 (1920) and 72 A.L.R. 709 (1931), the introductory
statement is made that the devisee is entitled to have a lien upon the property
devised to him paid out of the personal estate, "unless the testator has indi-
cated an intention to the contrary." In a later annotation on the subject at
120 A.L.R. 577 (1939) it is stated that whether the property is to be exoner-
ated "depends primarily upon the intention of the testator." A majority of
[Vol. 44
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A court may find intent to exonerate or not to exonerate implied in
language of the will which does not expressly relate to the mortgage as
such. It has been held in various cases that a devise of all of one's "right,
title, and interest" in a piece of property indicates an intent not to ex-
onerate.21 The majority rule appears to be that a general direction ad-
dressed to the executors to pay the debts of the decedent does not, of
itself, indicate a positive intent to exonerate the real property,22 al-
though in some jurisdictions, it has been held that such a direction does
have this effect.2 3 The devise of real property "subject to" a mortgage
has been interpreted in some instances to indicate an intent not to ex-
onerate the parcel in question,24 and in other cases has been held not to
have that effect, being only descriptive of the condition of the property
at the time the will was made.2 5 Likewise, the grant of the property
"absolutely" or "outright" has in some cases been held not to indicate
an intent to exonerate, but was said, instead, to be only descriptive
language used to distinguish a devise in fee from a life estate.26
The general rule of construction of wills is that a will is to be
construed as a whole, in the light of surrounding circumstances. Con-
sequently, such "surrounding circumstances" may be considered when
an effort to determine whether or not the testator intended to exonerate
property is being made. In determining whether a mortgage should be
paid off by the executor at the expense of the legacies, "the instrument
must be considered as a whole according to its own terms and in the
light of the circumstances of the testator. . ." and the nature and char-
acter of the property devised.27 The general rule of construction limits
the cases cited in this last annotation are from states which by that time had
passed statutes relating to the exoneration of devised property.
2l-Howell v. Ott, 182 Miss. 252, 180 So. 52 (1938) ; Savings Trust Co. v. Beck,
Mo. App., 73 S.W. 2d 282 (1934) ; Taylor v. Broadway Methodist Church, 269
Ky. 108, 106 S.W. 2d 69 (1937) ; 4 PAGE, WLLs §1490, supra note 10. But see
contra, Tobiason v. Machen, 217 Md. 207, 142A. 2d 145 (1958).221n re McNulta, 168 Wash. 397, 12 P. 2d 389 (1932); Savings Trust Co. v.
Beck, supra note 21; Estate of Budd, supra note 1; see Annot., 5 A.L.R. 488(1920) at 505 and cases cited therein; 97 CJ.S. Wills §1316(2) and §1322(2)
(1957).
23In re Estate of Johnson, 66 S.D. 331, 283 N.W. 151 (1938), where this provi-
sion was held to require exoneration even though the will provided that the
property should pass "subject to the mortgage."; Bridgeport Trust Co. v.
Fowler, 102 Conn. 318, 128 Atl. 719 (1925) ; United States Bd. of Tax Appeals
v. U.S., 26 F. 2d 1000 (D.C. 1928), cert. denied. 278 U.S. 621; 4 PAGE, WILLS§1490 and cases cited therein, supra note 10.
241 P-H Wills, Estates and Trust Service §432.25 and cases cited therein; 4
PAGE, WILLS §1490, supra note 10; Martin v. Martin, 310 Ill. App. 622, 35 N.E.
2d 560 (1941) ; contra, Tobiason v. Machen, supra note 21.
25 In re Estate of Johnson, supra note 23; In re Brackney, 166 Ia. 109, 147 N.W.
188 (1914); In re Woodworth, 31 Cal. 595 (1867); Johnson v. Child, 4 Hare.
87, 67 Eng. Rep. 572 (1844) (although exoneration denied on other grounds);
4 PAGE, WILLS §1490, supra note 10; Tobiason v. Machen, supra note 21.26 In re Reynolds, 94 Vt. 149, 109 Atl. 60 (1920) ; 4 PAGE, WILLs §1490, supra
note 10.
27Taylor v. Broadway Methodist Church, supra note 21.
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the consideration of surrounding circumstances to those existing at the
time of execution of the will, 2s but in matters relating to exoneration
there has been a strong tendency to disregard this time limitation, and
one court has stated that in determining the question of the intention
of the testator with reference to the exoneraion of his real estate from
liens thereon, the court will apply the rule that a will speaks as of the
date of the death of the testator, and hence it will take into consideration
any change in conditions which has occurred between the date of the
execution of the will and the date of the testator's death, in order to
determine the question whether the will, viewed from its four corners,
clearly and unmistakably requires, or manifests the intent of the testator,
that a mortgage debt upon land devised shall be paid or discharged out
of the testator's residuary estate.
29
"Surrounding circumstances" which will throw light on whether or
not exoneration was intended are, of course, as varied as the pattern of
life itself. However, some of the frequently recurring circumstances
tending to indicate an intention to exonerate the property are: execution
of a mortgage after execution of the will, 30 and, especially, a purchase-
money mortgage ;"1 sufficiency of the personal estate ;32 the fact that the
mortgage is large in proportion to the value of the burdened real estate ;23
and a closeness of relationship between the testator and the devisee.3 4
The situation which most often compels the courts to find that there
was no intention to exonerate is the case in which the mortgage is of
such size in relation to the personal property that application of the ex-
oneration principle would deprive the residuary legatees of most of
their bequest and thus defeat, to a large measure, the testator's plan of
28 Annot., 94 A.L.R. 26 (1935) at 222 and cases cited therein; 2 CALLAGHAN'S,
WISCONSIN PROBATE LAW §15.55 and §15.58 (6th ed. 1959) and cases cited
therein; Estate of Budd, supra note 1, citing Estate of Breese, 7 Wis. 2d 422,
96 N.W. 2d 422 (1959).
29Hannibal Trust Co. v. Elzea, 314 Mo. 485, 286 S.W. 371 (1926). See also
Kellam v. Jacob, 152 Va. 725, 148 S.E. 835 (1929) and Jacobs v. Button, 79
Conn. 360, 65 Atl. 150 (1906).
30 Brown v. James, 22 S.C. Eq. 24 (1848); 4 PAGE, WILLS §1490, supra note 10
and cases cited therein.
31 Ford v. Gaithur, 19 S.C. Eq. 270 (1846) ; Milner v. Mills, Mosely 123, 25 Eng.
Rep. 307 (Ch. 1729).
32 Johnson v. Child, supra note 25; Ruston v. Ruston, 2 DalU, 243, 1 L. Ed. 365
(1796) ; Union Trust Co. v. Brindlinger, 40 F. 2d 806 (1930).
a Draper v. Brown, 153 Mich. 120, 117 N.W. 213 (1908) ; Sheehy v. O'Donoghue,
68 App. D.C. 127, 94 F. 2d 252 (1938); In re Williamson's Estate, 302 Pa.
462, 153 Atl. 765 (1931) ; 4 PAGE, WILLS §1490, supra note 10.
3 Hapke v. Schafer-Doolin Mort. Co., 100 Okla. 70, 229 Pac. 621 (1924) (daugh-
ter) ; Cadoo v. Cadoo, 95 N.J. Eq. 430, 123 Atl. 712 (1924) (son) ; Tipping v.
Tipping, 1 P. Wms. 730, 24 Eng. Rep. 589 (Ch. 1721) (widow); Byrne v.
Hume, 84 Mich. 185, 47 N.W. 679 (1890) (aged parents); In re Towle v.
Swasey, 106 Mass. 100 (1870) (widow); Fulenwider v. Birmingham Trust &
Savings Co., 222 Ala. 95, 130 So. 801 (1930) (a favorite nephew). See also
In re Tunison's Estate, 75 F. Supp. 573 (D.C. 1948) where exoneration was
denied when the specific devisee was a stranger.
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disposition. 35 Other facts which have been held to show an intent not to
exonerate include ownership of only a partial interest in the property,
the whole of which is mortgaged,36 and the existence of a blanket
mortgage which covers both the specifically devised parcel and other
residuary property.37
The matter of the intention of the testator is also important in cases
governed by statute. However, since these statutes generally provide
that the devisee must bear the burden of the mortgage unless the will
otherwise provides, both the burden of proof and the burden of going
forward with the proof as to intent are removed from those interested
in protecting the residue of the estate, on whom they rest when the
question of exoneration under the common-law is at issue, and are
placed upon the specific devisee. In addition, some of these statutes
provide for a "clear" expression of intent on the part of the testator or
intent expressed on the "face" of the will, with the result that the
amount of proof of intent and the factors comprising it may also be
changed.
WISCONSIN CASE LAW
Wisconsin has never had a statute pertaining to the exoneration of
real property from liens existing thereon at the time of the death of
the decedent. And more interestingly, prior to the decision in Estate
of Budd,38 the question of exoneration of a specific devise had never
been directly considered by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, although
there are several earlier cases which either indirectly touched upon the
subject or have been thought to do so.
The first Wisconsin case sometimes cited as bearing upon the ques-
tion of exoneration is that of Edgerton v. Schneider,9 which was de-
cided in 1870. In that case one Cooper had died testate, leaving real
property subject to a mortgage. No claim for the payment thereof had
been filed in the probate proceedings. After the time for filing claims
had expired, the executor obtained an order from the court directing
him to sell the mortgaged real estate in order to pay other debts. An
executor's deed was given to the purchaser which made no mention of
the pre-existing mortgage. Upon action brought by the mortgagee to
foreclose his mortgage, the argument made by the then owner of the
35 Draper v. Brown, supra note 33; Taylor v. Broadway Methodist Church, supra
note 21; Hedger v. Judy, 95 Ky. 557, 26 S.W. 586 (1894); 4 PAGE, WILLS
§1490, supra note 10. But see contra, Philips v. Philips, 2 Bro. Ch. 273, 29
Eng. Rep. 150 (Ch. 1787).
36 Draper v. Brown, supra note 33, 4 PAGE, WILS §1490, supra note 10. This
reasoning has also been applied to jointly owned property. See Fulenwider
v. Birmingham Trust & Savings Co., supra note 34.
37 See annot., 168 A.L.R. 701 (1947); 57 Am. JuR. Wills §1474, supra note 10.
In such cases the mortgage is payable pro rata by those who succeed to the
realty.
38 Supra note 1.
39 26 Wis. 385 (1870).
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real estate, but rejected by the courts, both on trial and upon appeal,
was that the failure of the mortgagee to present his claim for allowance
in the Cooper probate proceeding had barred his right to pursue the
remedy of foreclosure.
Obviously, this case is not actually concerned with the right of ex-
oneration because the mortgaged property was not specifically devised
nor did it pass by descent, and it is only in such cases that the doctrine
would apply. It is never applicable to realty which is a part of the
residue of a testator's estate. The case has been cited in that connection,
however; probably because it does pertain to the closely related question
of whether an executor is bound to pay the mortgage in the absence of
the filing of a claim therefor.
The one case cited by most text authorities as the Wisconsin case
on exoneration is Will of Mann,40 which was decided in 1922. In that
case decedent and his sister owned a piece of real property which was
subject to a mortgage in amount of $20,000.00. By his last will Mann
specifically devised his interest in the property to his sister, and, after
describing the mortgage thereon, stated:
• . . if any part of the principal of said mortgage shall remain
unpaid at the time of my death, I direct my executor hereinafter
named to pay the entire balance of such unpaid principal (whether
owing by me or by my said sister), it being my intention that my
said sister shall receive title to said property free and clear of
said mortgage. If I shall have disposed of my interest in said
property prior to the time of my death, then and in that event
such devise of my interest in said property shall lapse and this
paragraph of my will shall be of no further effect.4
Sometime after the will was executed and before his death, the testator
conveyed his interest in the property to his sister by warranty deed,
which deed recited that said premises were free and clear of encum-
brances, "except that certain mortgages of $20,000 ... which said mort-
gage said second party, Frances Mann Wolff, hereby assumes and
agrees to pay when due as a part of the consideration hereof." During
the course of probate of the estate the executor petitioned for a con-
struction of the will, and the County Court of Milwaukee County con-
strued the above-quoted provision as a valid direction which created a
charge upon the general assets of the estate. This decision was upheld
upon appeal, the reasoning thereon being that: The testator in his will
had expressly declared it to be his intention that his sister should re-
ceive title to the property free and clear of the mortgage; The fact that
he saw fit to vest title in her by deed prior to his death was not in
contravention of the devise, but in furtherance of it; This act did not
wholly carry out his purpose, however, since he also intended, as a part
40 179 Wis. 66, 190 N.W. 830 (1922).
41 Id. at 67.
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of his testamentary plan, that the entire balance of the mortgage prin-
cipal should be paid at the time of his death, whether owing by him or
by his sister, and that his sister should then have title to the property
free and clear of the mortgage. It was also decided that the last sentence
of the paragraph in which the devise was made provided for its lapse
only in the event of a disposition of the property to a third person and
that, since this had not occurred, the paragraph was still effective, and
the mortgage principal must be paid from the general estate.
This case, obviously, is one falling behind the first category of cases
above mentioned. 2 It is a case involving construction of actual words
of bequest for the purpose of determining whether the testator by a
positive direction on his part ordered the mortgage paid, thereby making
an additional gift to his sister. It in no way involves the common-law
theory of exoneration and could not, since the mortgaged property was
not a part of the testator's testamentary estate and did not, in fact, pass
to the sister as a specific devise under her brother's will.
In Will of Hurley,4 3 decided in 1927, an executor, who had continued
to administer an estate for twelve years without making a final settle-
ment, was allowed credit for interest paid on mortgages on the real
property during that time. In its opinion the Supreme Court distin-
guished its ruling from the holding in certain New York cases cited,
stating:
The New York cases holding that an executor is not entitled to
credit for interest paid upon mortgages against real estate in his
possession were decided under a statute which makes it the duty
of the heir or devisee to 'satisfy and discharge the mortgage out
of his own property without resorting to the executor or ad-
ministrator.'"
The inference here is that the state of Wisconsin, not having a similar
statute, follows the common-law rule of exoneration, and that, since the
executor must ultimately pay the mortgage, he must, in the meantime,
pay the interest thereon. The fault in the reasoning of this case is that
it stops at this point without examination of the facts to determine
whether the doctrine of exoneration is actually applicable, even in the
absence of statute. Since the mortgaged real property was actually a part
of the residue of the estate, 5 the doctrine could not, in fact, have ap-
plied, and any inference drawn from the language of this opinion is,
at the most, based on dicta.
Ironically, the only Wisconsin case which, prior to the present time,
would have put the question of the right of a specific devisee to have
the mortgage on the real property paid at the expense of the personal
42 Supra p. 293.
43 193 Wis. 20, 213 N.W. 639 (1927).
44Id. at 24.
45 See page 8, appellant's appendix, Will of Hurley, supra note 43.
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residue before the state Supreme Court was Estate of Pitcher," which,
because of a defect in the notice of appeal, was not decided on its
merits. Also ironically, in that case the devisee was appealing from a
lower court decision which had held that the real property should be
exonerated from the testator's mortgage. This peculiarity arose from
the fact that the personal residue remaining after payment of claims
and costs of administration amounted to only $600.00. The lower court
ordered that the real property should go to the specific devisee subject
to the mortgage; that the remaining personal estate should first be used
to pay the specific money bequests and that:
in the event there is anything left in the way of a residue,
this amount of money shall be charged with the payment of the
mortgage on the homestead, and the same may be applied by
paying the same on the mortgage or paying it direct to Charles
O'Deal. (The devisee)1
The priorities of payment established by this order followed the rule
that a specific legatee is not required under the exoneration rule to con-
tribute to the payment of a mortgage on property specifically devised.
In this particular case, however, very little money would have been
available to the devisee after payment of the specific bequests, a fact
which, no doubt, prompted him to claim that his was the position of
an ordinary creditor entitled to share pro-rata with all other creditors
in the available funds before payment of the specific bequests.4 s Unfor-
tunately, this interesting theory, which, if tested, probably would have
resulted both in a decision on the applicability of the common-law rule
of exoneration in this state, and also in a ruling on the priorities of
payment connected therewith never reached the Supreme Court on its
merits.49
The fact situation in Estate of Budd50 was as follows: The deceased,
Mabel Ruth Budd, owned a home, one piece of business property, and
some'personalty. An $18,000 mortgage had been placed upon the home-
stead in 1953. In 1957 Mrs. Budd made a will in which she devised the
home to her husband, made some specific and pecuniary bequests, and
left the residue of her estate to certain-nieces and nephews. In 1958 she
executed a codicil to the will in which she changed some of the specific
46 240 Wis. 356, 2 N.W. 2d 729 (1942).
47 Id: at 359.
48 The same result could have been achieved in this case with the more logical
argument that the Court should adopt the view that pecuniary bequests abate
in favor of the necessity of exonerating the specific devise. See discussion on
priorities of payment at page 303 hereof.
49 Although the basic question of the right of a specific devisee to have the real
estate given to him exonerated at the expense of the personal estate is deter-
mined by the decision in the recent case of Estate of Budd, supra note 1, the
Court expressly reserved its opinion on the question of priorities of payment
in view of the fact that there was sufficient personal property on hand to pay
all creditors, specific legatees, and the mortgagee.
50 Supra note 1.
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bequests and increased their total amount. Two months after the execu-
tion of the codicil, Mrs. Budd died. At the time of her death the unpaid
balance on the mortgage was $4,500. The debts, administration expenses,
and the specific bequests exceeded the total personal estate and the
executors, therefore, sold the business property, pursuant to a power
of sale contained in the will. No claim for the payment of the mortgage
was filed within the time allowed, but thereafter the widower, by peti-
tion to the court, requested payment of the mortgage on the property
devised to him. After a hearing on the matter, the Milwaukee County
Court made a finding that:
The will of the testatrix contains no express direction as to
whether the real estate . . . should pass to the devisee named,
free and clear of the mortgage to which it was subject at the
time of her death, and from a study of the entire will it appears
that testatrix did not express an intent as to whether or not said
real estate should so pass and therefore did not intend that said
real estate should pass free and clear of the mortgage to which
it was subject at the time of her death.51
On appeal, it was argued that the Wisconsin Constitution provides
that the common law shall be the law of this state until changed or
abrogated by the Legislature ;52 that the common-law rule, which in this
state has not been abrogated by legislation, is that the specific devisee
is entitled to have the real property exonerated from the mortgage un-
less the will shows a contrary intent; and, that since the lower court
had found that the testatrix did not express an intent as to whether or
not the property should piss free and clear of the mortgage, then it
should have concluded under the law that it did so pass. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court concurred in this reasoning:
It is, therefore, clear that the common-law rule, as adopted by
constitutional provision, is that the devisee of mortgaged prop-
erty is entitled to have the mortgage discharged from other assets,
in situations where the will does not disclose a contrary -intent.
This common-law concept has not been altered or suspended by
legislation in this state .... 53
The additional question then presented was whether the widower
in this particular situation was entitled to exoneration of the mortgage
in view of the fact that the personal property of the decedent was less
than the amount needed to pay the administration expenses and claims
and to satisfy the specific bequests. On this issue it was argued by
appellant that the doctrine of equitable conversion was applicable, since
51 Paragraph 3 of Court's findings of fact in Estate of Budd, Milwaukee County
Court File #367-738.52 Article XIV, Sec. 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: "Such parts of
the common law as are now in force in the territory of Wisconsin, not incon-
sistent with this constitution, shall be and continue part of the law of this
state until altered or suspended by the legislature."
53 Estate of Budd, supra note 1, at 258.
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the will contained a power of sale and the plan of disposition of the
testatrix made sale of the piece of business property necessary in order
to carry out that plan; and, that as a result, the proceeds from the sale
of this realty were to be treated as personalty for all purposes from the
date of death. 54 The Court apparently adopted this view, but without
comment, merely remarking that there was "sufficient personal property
in the hands of the executors, including the fund derived from the sale
of the real estate," 55 (italics added) for the payment of the mortgage
and ordered the same discharged.
As a result of this decision, several points of law in the area under
discussion are clarified: First, the common-law rule of exoneration is
in effect in Wisconsin. Second, the devisee is not required to file a
claim in order to perfect his right to have the property exonerated from
the mortgage, the Court having stated that it found no merit in that
contention. 56 Third, a direction in the will that all debts be paid will
not be construed to show an intent either to exonerate or not to exon-
erate the property.5 7
The questions of law not decided by this case are pointed up by the
Court's statement that the devisee is entitled to have the mortgage dis-
charged "from other assets,"'5' and also by the following paragraph
near the end of its opinion:
We have no problem of priorities presented in the instant case
as a result of granting the exoneration of the mortgage on the
Center street property, there being sufficient personal property
in the hands of the executors, including the fund derived from
the sale of the real estate .... Therefore, we refrain at this time
from discussing the priority issue, reserving our opinion with
respect thereto until a case arises which calls for disposition of
such issue.59
In other words, although it is clear from this decision that the com-
mon-law doctrine of exoneration of a specific devise is applicable in
Wisconsin, the highly practical matters of the source from which the
funds are to be drawn and the order in which the obligations are to be
satisfied are left unanswered. Of course, in these matters, one must look
to the common law for the answers, but it is in these areas that there
is some conflict of opinion as to just what the common law really is.
54 Estate of Budd, Appellant's Brief, pages 13 and 14, incl.
55 Estate of Budd, supra note 1, at 258.56 Id. at 258. The position of this statement at the beginning of the paragraph
in which it is stated that no question of priorities is involved in the case might
seem to suggest that a claim should be filed if priorities were at issue. How-
ever, no decisions have been noted in which, after the right to exoneration
was determined, the presence or absence of a claim affected the source of
funds available to accomplish payment.
57 At p. 256 of its opinion, in Estate of Budd. supra note 1, the Court referred
to this provision of the will as "a general direction to pay debts and nothing
more."5s Estate of Budd, supra note 1, at 258.
59 Ibid.
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SOURCES OF PAYMENT AND PRIORITIES
The general rule is that exoneration of lands specifically devised
is to be accomplished out of the personalty.P0 The order of payment
then usually recognized is resort to lands devised expressly for the pay-
ment of debts; lands descended to the heir; and lands specifically de-
vised which are charged with the payment of debts, successively.61 In
Wisconsin, however, the marshalling of funds for the payment of debts
is controlled by statute, and possibly, in view of this statute, lands
charged with the payment of debts would be marshalled ahead of intes-
tate realty, although neither would be available until the residuary
personalty had been exhausted. 2 By virtue of modem custom and prac-
tice, however, the last three categories have become relatively unim-
portant.63 It has been held in a few cases that, where personalty and
realty are blended as one by the will, both become available to discharge
the mortgage on specifically devised property." However, this rule is
not applicable merely because the personalty and the real estate are
disposed of together in the residuary clause of the will."
In Wisconsin, at least, a method of enlarging the fund to which the
specific devisee may look for the payment of the mortgage is by invoking
the doctrine of equitable conversion, which, when applied in a proper
case, will cause the court to look upon the realty contained in the residue
as personalty, in its entirety and for all purposes, as of the date of
death." This doctrine is applicable in cases in which the will contains
a power of sale and factors are present which make exercise of the
power "mandatory by implication."6 7 However, if the circumstances
are such that equitable conversion is deemed to take place at a time later
than the death of the testator, the theory would not logically inure to the
benefit of the specific devisee.6s
6oSupra notes 4 and 10.
6197 C.J.S. §1316, supra note 22; 3 JARmAN, WILLs 471, mspra note 11; 1 UNDER-
HILL, LAW OF WILLS 532 (1900).
62 WIS. STATs. §312.04 (1959), §313.26 (1959), and §31327 (1959).
63 57 AM. Jun. §1469 and §1470, supra note 10.
64 Pyott's Case, 160 Pa. 441, 28 At. 915 (1894) ; 97 C.J.S. §1322, supra note 22
and cases cited therein. Although not so identified, this is actually a type of
equitable conversion. 5A THoMPsON, REAL PR OPERTY 935 §2631 (1957). See
4 PAGE, WILLS §1479, supra note 10, for a discussion on the effect of "blend-
ing" on payment of debts generally.
65 97 CJ.S. §1322, supra note 22.
66 See discussion of application of this theory in Estate of Budd, mspra note 1,
at 301 hereof. For a discussion of the combined use of the theories of ex-
oneration and equitable conversion also see 1955 U. ILL. L. F. 743, 752 (1955).
67 Estate of Dusterhoft, 270 Wis. 5, 70 N.W. 2d 239 (1955) ; Becker v. Chester,
115 Wis. 90, 91 N.W. 87 (1902); Will of Schilling, 205 Wis. 259, 237 N.W.
122 (1931) ; Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 28 N.W. 353 (1886) ; Benner v.
Mauer, 133 Wis. 325, 113 N.W. 663 (1907); Harrinngton v. Pier, 105 Wis.
485, 82 N.W. 345 (1900) ; Will of Fitton, 218 Wis. 63, 259 N.W. 718 (1935).
68 See 19 AM. JuR. Equitable Conversion §26 (1939) for general discussion of
the time of conversion of real estate passing by will.
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With regard to the order in which the various persons claiming from
an estate are to be paid, the general rule is that debts and administration
expenses shall first be paid, followed by payment of specific legacies,
and that, thereafter, the specifically devised realty shall be exonerated.
6 9
The one big area of disagreement is whether pecuniary bequests are
to be paid prior to exoneration of the devised real estate or thereafter.
One view is that the mortgage is to be discharged from the personalty
contained in the "residue," and that the residue is that which remains
after all bequests have been paid, which reasoning protects the pecuniary
bequest from diminution.7 0 The other theory is that debts are to be
paid from the personal estate, and that the specific devisee should not
be deprived of his right of exoneration out of such assets by a bequest
which differs slightly and only in form from a residuary bequest. 71 The
view of the English courts was that the pecuniary bequest took prece-
dence over the payment of the mortgage ;72 the court explaining in the
case of Johnson v. Child73 that this rule had developed through the
courts' reading into wills an intention not to exonerate in those cases
in which the pecuniary bequests would be diminished by payment of the
mortgage.
In its efforts to settle the question of the priority of the pecuniary
bequest in terms of an intention imputed to the testator, at least one
court concluded that if the mortgage was given subsequent to the ex-
ecution of the will, then pecuniary bequests must abate in its favor, but
otherwise not.74 This reasoning was based on the assumption that a
testator was aware of the size of his estate and the existence of any
mortgage at the time he executed his will and that, if he had intended
the mortgage to be paid for the benefit of the specific devisee, he would
not have made pecuniary bequests in excess of the amount of personalty
which would be available after the mortgage payment. It would seem,
however, that the more logical approach would be to determine whether
or not the testator intended exoneration in the first instance, and if it
is to be had, then the order of payment should follow definite rules and
not, of itself, be dependent upon intent.
The pecuniary bequest serves a definite purpose, and the English
theory that it should be favored over the right of exoneration is prob-
6957 Am. JUR. §1474, supra note 10; 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators
§484 (1942); 4 PAGE, WILLS §1486, supra note 10.70 Ruston v. Ruston, supra note 32; Harris v. Dodge, 72 Md. 186, 19 Atl. 597
(1890); Glass v. Dunn, 17 O.S. 413 (Ohio 1867); Wheeler v. Hatheway, 54
Mich. 547, 20 N.W. 579 (1884).
71 Brown v. Baron, 162 Mass. 56, 37 N.E. 772 (1894); Towle v. Swasey, supra
note 34; Currie v. Scott, 144 Tex. 1, 187 S.W. 2d 551 (1945); Todd v. McFall,
96 Va. 754, 32 S.E. 472 (1899); In re Sutton, 11 Del Ch. 460, 97 Atl. 624(1916) ; Morris v. Higbie, 53 N.J. Eq. 173, 27 Atl. 438 (1893).
72 Hamilton v. Worley, 2 Ves. Jr. 62, 30 Eng. Rep. 523, 4 Bro. Ch. 199, 29 Eng.
Rep. 849 (Ch. 1793) ; Johnson v. Child, supra note 25.
73 Supra note 25.74 Lapp v. Lapp, 16 Grant Ch. (U.C.) 159 (1869).
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ably preferable. Such authors as have ventured an opinion on the matter
lean toward the theory that the majority rule is that the pecuniary
legatee does not contribute toward the payment of the mortgage7" even
though the courts of a number of states have held otherwise.7" The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has not, of course, been presented with this
question. In the Pitcher77 case, however, a Wisconsin county court had
directed payment of pecuniary bequests prior to the payment of the
mortgage.
At one time the same question was debated with regard to the gen-
eral bequest, i.e.-the bequest of all of the testator's personalty to a
particular person. However, the consensus of opinion seems to be that
such a bequest differs in no substantial way from a bequest of the resi-
due and should, therefore, be available to exonerate the mortgage on
specifically devised property.78
OTHER ENCUMBRANCES REQUIRED TO BE PAID FOR THE
BENEFIT OF THE SPECIFIC DEVISEE
In addition to the strict mortgage, the common-law principle of
exoneration applies to other liens on the specifically devised property;
the basic requirement being that the lien be a primary personal ob-
ligation7 9 of the devisor. Under this theory real estate taxes have been
ordered paid for the devisee in those jurisdictions in which they are
considered a personal obligation." Presumably, this would formerly
75 1 UNDERHILi, LAw OF WILS 387, supra note 61; 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PRO-
PERTY §14.25, supra note 11; 5 A.L.R. 428, 493 (1920); 97 C.J.S. §1322, supra
note 22.76Cases cited, supra note 71.
7 Estate of Pitcher, supra note 46. Wis. STAT. §313.28 (1959). This statute
provides: "The estate, real and personal, given by will, when required for
that purpose, shall be held liable for the payment of debts, expenses of admin-
istration and family expenses in proportion to the several devises and legacies;
except that specific devises and legacies, and the persons to whom made, shall
be exempted if there is other sufficient estate and it shall appear necessary in
order to effect the intention of the testator." But there has been no construc-
tion of this statute which would throw light on the problem discussed above.
784 PAGE, WILLs §1486, supra note 10.
79 "Obligation" is a term which has been broadened in meaning to such a point
that it defies definition. In its original and most technical common law sense,
it was limited to written instruments under seal whereby a man bound him-
self, under penalty, to do a certain thing. At a later point, it became any
writing containing a promise to pay money or to do a certain thing, and it may
have been in this sense that the term was used in the early English cases
relating to exoneration of specifically devised property. See cases cited supra
notes 4 and 10. In later English cases and in cases involving exoneration in
the United States, the term has been used in its broader sense to include any
duty, whether imposed by law, promise, or contract. See Bouvin's, LAw
DICTIONARY (Baldwin's ed. 1934) ; BLAci's, LAW DIcrIoNARY (3rd ed. 1933) ;
29 WORDS AND PHRASES 30 (1940); and 67 C.J.S. p. 12 (1950). For a discus-
sion of meaning of "personal" obligation see 40 HARv. L. REv. 630, 632, supra
note 6 and annot., 120 A.L.R. 577, 579 (1939).
80 In re Gill, 199 N.Y. 155, 92 N.E. 390 (1910); Braden v. Coale, 165 Md. 150,
166 Atl. 730 (1933). But see Barlow v. Cain, 146 Ark. 160, 225 S.W. 228
(1920), where the taxes were held not to be a personal obligation.
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have been true in Wisconsin.8' However, the common-law doctrine is
no longer applicable to current real estate taxes in this state in view of
Sec. 74.62(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes, which provides that real estate
taxes imposed in the year of the devisor's death are to be pro-rated
between the estate and the specific devisee, in the absence of any specific
direction in the will. Mechanic's liens,8 2 judgment liens,83 and vendors'
equitable liens for the purchase price 4 are also encumbrances which the
executor has been called upon to discharge for the benefit of the specific
devisee.
EXONERATION OF INTESTATE REALTY AND SPECIFIC LEGACIES
The doctrine of exoneration is also applicable for the benefit of
persons other than the specific devisee. It may be invoked by an heir
of real property in the case of intestacy.8,5 However, under modern
statutes the same persons generally take both the personalty and the
realty, with the result that no economic benefit may derive from its
application. A beneficiary is also entitled to call upon the executor to
exonerate his specific legacy upon the same principles which apply in
the case of the specific devise.8 8 The doctrine has been effectively ap-
plied to the benefit of the specific legatee in cases involving chattel
mortgages and debts secured by a pledge of the personalty devised.7
Historically, the right of exoneration has applied only to probate
property; the right being available only to a specific legatee or devisee
or to an heir. There have been a few cases in which a surviving joint
tenant has demanded exoneration of the property jointly owned with
the deceased, but in such cases the rule was protected from extension
by a finding that an intent not to exonerate was inferrable from the
circumstance of joint ownership. 8 It also seems probable that an intent
not to exonerate would be imputed to a decedent who had, during his
lifetime, pledged life insurance policies on his own life as security for
81 See Mariner v. Milwaukee, 146 Wis. 605, 609, 131 N.W. 442 (1911) in which
it is stated, "Taxes are debts due to the government which a property owner
has no more right to withhold than the most sacred debt of a private nature."
Also Warden v. Board of Supervisors of Fond du Lac County, 14 Wis. 672
(1861).
82 Bethel v. Magness . . . Okda ..... 296 P. 2d 792 (1956); 26A C.J.S. §125e,
supra note 10 and cases cited therein at note 99. See Wis. STAT. §289.06(1959) for provision regarding perfecting of mechanic's lien after death of
property owner, ". . . with like effect as if he were then living." Query, how-
ever, whether the lien of a subcontractor would be a "personal obligation ?"
83 Fenstermacher's Appeal, 174 Pa. 476, 34 Atl. 120 (1896); Todd v. McFall,
supra note 71.
84 26A C.J.S. §125c, supra note 10.
85 ATKINSON, WILLS §137 (2d ed. 1953) ; 4 PAGE, WILLS §1486, supra note 10; 35
TEXAS L. R.Ev. 289 (1956); annot., 5 A.L.R. 488 (1920); 72 A.L.R. 709 (1931);
and 120 A.L.R. 577 (1939)
86 ATKINSON, WILLS §137, supra note 85; 3 JARMAN, WILLS 471, supra note 11;
3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §14.25, supra note 11; 4 PAGE, WILLS §1486,
supra note 10.
87 See authorities cited, supra note 87 and cases cited therein.
88 Fulenwider v. Birmingham Trust & Savings Co., supra note 34.
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monies borrowed, even though the policies were payable upon his death
to named beneficiaries.
PROCEDURE To DETERMINE RIGHT TO EXONERATION
The mortgagee may either file a claim for the payment of the mort-
gage or may forego the presentation of a claim against the estate and
rely solely on his security. 9 The majority rule appears to be that the
failure of the mortgagee to file a claim against the estate within the time
allowed does not bar the specific devisee's right to have the property
exonerated from the mortgage.90
In an informal manner, the filing of a claim for the payment of the
mortgage by its holder may call attention to the exoneration issue, but
the mere existence of the claim does not put the various classes of
beneficiaries on notice as to all of the ramifications of the exoneration
question, nor does the allowance of the claim in the usual manner con-
stitute an order which will properly protect the rights of a devisee.
The devisee seeking to have his devise exonerated should at least make
a written demand therefor upon the executor, and the better and more
efficient practice would be to petition the probate court for an order
directing the executor to exonerate the real property. While authorities
are generally in agreement that the devisee need not take action within
the time limited for the filing of claims by creditors,91 any attempt to
proceed against the residuary legatees after settlement of the estate
should fail as a collateral attack on the judgment of the probate court.92
An executor has been held personally liable to the specific devisee
for refusing to exonerate real property in a proper case.9 3 On the other
hand, since it is the duty of the executor to protect the residue of the
estate,94 if he acts without authorization, he does so at his own peril.
The only prudent course, therefore, is for the executor to obtain an
order of the court either directing that the specific devise be exonerated
or not be exonerated in each instance in which the question arises. 5
This obligation on his part raises the question as to how much investiga-
89 Edgerton v. Schneider, supra note 39; 2 CALLAGHAN'S, WISCONSIN PROBATE
LAW §9.36, .supra note 28; ATKINSON, WILLS §127, supra note 85; 4 PAGE.
WILLS §1486, supra note 10.
90 THo IPSON, WILLS p. 707 and cases cited therein, supra note 11; ATKINsON,
WILLS §127, supra note 85; Johnson v. Johnson, 66 S.D. 331, 283 N.W. 151
(1938); In re Brackey's Estate, 166 Ia. 109, 147 N.W. 188 (1914); Smith v.
Kibbe, 104 Kan. 159, 178 Pac. 427 (1919); Appeal of Board, 78 Conn. 481, 62
Atl. 704 (1906). Contra, Howell v. Ott, supra note 21.
91 Authorities cited, supra note 90.
9249 C.J.S. Judgments §402 (1947); 1 CLLAGEAN'S, WISCONSIN PROBATE LAW§2.155, supra note 28.
93 Schade v. Connor, 84 Neb. 51, 120 N.W. 1012 (1909).
94 1 CALLAGHAN'S, WISCONSIN PROBATE LAW §7.280, supra note 28.
95 If the mortgagee has filed a claim, the executor should, of course, object thereto
in any case in which there is any likelihood that the property passes cur onere.
This procedure does not, of itself, however, bring before the Court all of the
questions related to the ultimate burden of the debt if the claim is allowed.
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tion the executor is required to make of the circumstances surrounding
the testator at the time of the execution of the will, since those circum-
stances might be indicative of an intent not to exonerate the property,96
which finding would save the personal estate from depletion.
WILL PROVISIONS RELATING TO PAYMENT OF LIENS
In view of the many problems posed by the exoneration principle,
the only reasonable course for those drafting wills, especially in those
states following the common-law rule, is to include therein a provision
with regard to the payment of encumbrances. In view of the differences
in the law in the various jurisdictions, no one form is suitable in all
cases. However, the draftsman would be well advised to avoid the
phrase, "subject to the mortgage.197 He should state whether the pro-
vision is intended to apply to probate property, or non-probate property,
or both; to real property, personal property, or both; to mortgages only
or to all liens; and to encumbrances existing prior to the execution of
the will or those arising thereafter, or both.98 In addition, he should
state whether the payment of the encumbrance is to be a charge upon
the estate generally or upon the personal residue only,99 and if the
latter, whether pecuniary legacies are to abate in its favor.
STATUTORY MODIFICATION OF THE EXONERATION DOCTRINE
It has been held that the Wills Act 00 does not affect the common-law
rule of exoneration.10' England and a number of the states of the
United States have, however, passed special statutes which either
modify the doctrine or abrogate it entirely. Since these statutes are in
derogation of the common law, they must be strictly construed,10 2 and,
consequently, some of them have not fully accomplished the result which
their proponents intended.
In some jurisdictions the placing of a mortgage upon real property
devised by a will previously executed was at one time considered an
act in revocation of the will,'03 and statutes were passed providing that
96 See p. 295 hereof.
9 See p. 295 hereof.
98 Authorities cited, supra note 30.
99 As discussed herein at p. 294. when an express direction for payment of liens
is included in the will, the matter may no longer be one of common law exon-
eration, but, instead, the testator may be held to have made an additional
bequest which is a charge upon the residue of his estate. See Will of Mann,
supra note 19, and also related text discussion. Also Brener v. Raasch, 239
Wis. 300, 1 N.W. 2d 181 (1941) where a direction to cancel a mortgage held by
the testator on property previously sold to his brother was held to create a
specific legacy in the brother's favor. It would seem that this same reasoning
would be applied in a case containing all the elements necessary for the com-
mon law exoneration.100 This act corresponds generally to Wis. STATS, Chapter 238, entitled "Wills."
lolEmuss v. Smith, 2 De. G. & S. M. 722. 64 Eng. Rep. 323 (Ch. 1848).
102 In re Cloninger's Estate, 8 Wash. 2d 348, 112 P. 2d 139 (1941); See also,
Page, Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, The Canon as an Analytical
Tool, 1956 Wis. L. Rv. 78, supra note 15.
103 See 57 Am. JuL. §537 and §538, supra note 10; 95 C. J .S .Wills §294 (1957).
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the execution of a subsequent mortgage should not have this effect.10 4
There has been a sharp difference of opinion as to whether these statutes
abrogate the common-law rule of exoneration; the majority rule being
that they have not changed the doctrine, although there is a strong
minority holding that they have done so with regard to mortgages ex-
ecuted subsequent to the execution of the will.105 Statutes of this type
generally apply by their terms to both real and personal property,106 but
only in those cases where they pass by will. Because of their limited
scope and the difficulties in interpretation, some states have broadened
these statutes by adding provisions of the type next discussed. 07
The second type of statute changing the common-law rule of exon-
eration follows the English pattern and contains an outright statement
that the devisee shall not be entitled to look to the executor for payment
of the mortgage, but shall pay the same from his own funds ;""s that he
shall take the property "subject to the mortgage" ;109 or that he shall
104 ORE. STAT. ANN. §114.150 (1957); CAL. STAT. ANN. §78 (Probate Code)
(1959); WASH'. STAT. ANN. §11.12.070 (1959); Mo. STAT. AINN. §468.270(1949. But see, Mo. STAT. ANN. (1957 Supp.) §474.450 (1957).
105 34 ORE. L. REV. 211 (1954). For cases holding that this type of statute as
enacted in Washington does not abrogate the common law, see in re Clon-
inger's Estate, supra note 102. In Hannibal Trust Co. v. Elzea, supra note 29
and Rice v. Gates, 320 Mo. 580. 8 S.W. 2d 614 (1928) a similar Missouri
statute (since changed) was held to prevent exoneration of property from a
mortgage executed subsequent to the will.
106 Supra note 104.
107 Compare §474.450 (1957) of the new Missouri Probate Code and Missouri's
prior statute on the same subject, Mo. STAT. ANN. §M468.270 (1949). An addi-
tion of this type was also made to the Washington statute, cited at note 104,
supra, in 1955.108 N.Y. STAT. ANN. §250, Real Property Law (1951): "Where real property,
subject to a mortgage executed by any ancestor or testator, or subject to any
other charge including a lien for unpaid purchase money, descends to a dis-
tributee, or passes to a devisee, such distributee or devisee must satisfy and
discharge the mortgage or other charge out of his own property, without
resorting to the executor or administrator of his ancestor or testator, unless
there will be in the will of such testator a direction, expressly or by necessary
implication, that such mortgage or other charge be otherwise paid. Where
such real property is distributed or devised to two or more persons, the interest
in the real property so distributed or devised to each of these persons shall,
as between such distributees or devisees, bear its proportionate share of the
total mortgage or other charge."; OxLA. STAT. ANN. §5, Title 46 (1954):
"When real property, subject to a mortgage, passes by succession or will, the
successor or devisee must satisfy the mortgage out of his own property,
without resorting to the executor or administrator of the mortgagor, unless
there is an express direction in the will of the mortgagor that the mortgage
shall be otherwise paid." S. D. STAT. ANN. §56.0227 (1960, supp.) : "When
real estate subject to mortgage passes by will, the devisee must satisfy the
mortgage out of his own property without resorting to the estate of the
decedent unless there is an express direction in the will that the mortgage
shall be otherwise paid."
109 PA. STAT. ANN. §242, Title 20 (1950): "Unless the testator shall otherwise
direct by his will, the devisee of real estate which is subject to mortgage shall
take subject thereto, and shall not be entitled to exoneration out of the other
estate of the testator, real or personal; and this whether the mortgage was
created by the testator or by a previous owner or owners, and notwithstanding
any general direction by the testator that his debts be paid."; N. J. STAT. ANN.§3A:26-1 (1953): "When real estate subject to a mortgage descends to an
1960-61]
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take only the interest which the decedent had in the property at the time
of his death. 110 Statutes of this type do abrogate the common-law rule,
but the wording first mentioned, although more cumbersome, seems
preferable as the most precise. Matters to be considered in connection
with such a statute is: whether it operates only to deprive the specific
devisee of the right of exoneration or is equally applicable to the specific
legatee and the heir; whether it prevents exoneration only in the case
of a strict mortgage or relates to all types of charges and liens; and
whether it applies to liens existing or wills executed prior to its adoption;
All of these statutes, of course, contain a proviso that the statute
shall apply unless the testator shall in some way indicate a contrary
intention, but there is considerable variation in the manner in which
this may be done. The New York statute1 1 provides that a "direction,
expressly or by necessary implication," will defeat the statute, and the
New Jersey provision"12 is similar in that the will must "expressly or
impliedly" direct that the mortgage be paid. The Pennsylvania statute"
provides that the testator must "otherwise direct," but further states
that the statute shall be applicable "notwithstanding any general direc-
tion by the testator that his debts be paid." The Oklahoma"' and the
South Dakota 1 5 statutes provide for an "express direction." In Massa-
chusetts116 the statute is invoked in distributing the testator's estate
"unless the contrary shall plainly appear by his will." The second section
of the present Missouri statute"17 (which implements a section providing
that a subsequent mortgage shall not revoke a will) provides that prop-
erty mortgaged after the execution of the will shall be exonerated unless
"it appears from the terms of the loan agreement or from the circum-
stances surrounding the loan transaction that the testator intended that
heir or passes to a devisee, such heir or devisee shall not be entitled to have
such mortgage discharged out of the personalty or any other real estate of
the ancestor or testator, but such real estate so descending or passing to him
shall be primarily liable for the mortgage debt, unless the will of the testator
shall expressly or impliedly direct that the mortgage be otherwise paid."
110 MAss. STAT. ANN. §23, Chapter 191 (1955) : "In all wills made subsequent to
January first, nineteen hundred and ten, a specific devise of real estate subject
to a mortgage given by the testator, unless the contrary shall plainly appear
by his will, shall be deemed to be the devise of the interest only which the
testator had at the time of his decease in such real estate over and above
such mortgage, and if the note or obligation of the testator secured by such
mortgage be paid out of his other property, after his decease, the executor
of his will or the administrator with the will annexed of his estate shall, at
the request of any person interested and by leave of the probate court, sell
such real estate specifically devised for the purpose of satisfying the estate
of the testator for the amount so paid, together with the costs and expenses
thereof."
111 Supra note 108.
112 Supra note 109.
11 Ibid.
11 Supra note 108.
115 Ibid.
116 Supra note 110.
"1 See new Missouri Probate Code §474.450 (1957 Supp.), supra note 107.
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the encumbrances should be paid out of the encumbered property rather
than from his general estate."
The many problems posed by the existence of the common-law doc-
trine of exoneration plus the fact that it is doubtful that it effectuates
the testator's true intent in most instances are strong arguments for its
repeal. It would seem that any statute for this purpose should completely
eliminate the possibility of exoneration, except where the testator ex-
pressly directs1 s otherwise by his will in terms other than by a general
direction to pay debts. In fairness, the law should apply to all classes
of persons and property and to all types of charges. In view of the
holding in certain Wisconsin cases that an express direction to pay an
obligation is a charge upon the general estate" 9 whereas common-law
exoneration normally thrusts the burden only on personal property, this
matter, too, should be spelled out in any statute enacted in this state.
The better provision would seem to be one in accord with present case
law and providing that in those instances in which the testator does
direct the payment of the lien, the same shall be a charge on the general
estate.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Estate of Budd °20 has made clear that the common-
law rule of exoneration of a specific devise from a mortgage existing
thereon at the time of the testator's death is recognized in the state of
Wisconsin, from which it follows that the doctrine should also be recog-
nized by Wisconsin courts in any proper case involving an heir or a
specific legatee. That the problems involved are difficult of solution was
first recorded by the reporter for Lord Hardwicke, the chancellor who
rendered the decision in Galton v. Hancock,'2 1 one of the earliest cases
involving exoneration. The reporter prefaced his Lordship's opinion
therein with the statement:
"His Lordship having taken a twelfth month to consider this
day gave his opinion on the matter as follows :"
"18This is contrary to recommendation found in MODEL PROBATE CODE §189
(1946) which states, ". . . either expressly or by necessary implication."
"2 Will of Mann, supra note 19; Brener v. Raasch, supra note 99.
120 Supra note 1.
2 1 Supra note 7.
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